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Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes
REVIEWED BY

L.C.

GREEN*

LEVIE, HOWARD S., TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR
CRIMES; Oceana, Dobbs Ferry (1993); ($65.00); ISBN 0-379-20148-8;
721 pp. (hardcover).
Those interested in the law of war crimes have often been hindered in their research by the lack of anything in the nature of a single volume compendium. Researchers have had to rely on the very
lengthy Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments, the reports of the subsidiary
trials held by the United States at Nuremberg, the thirteen volumes
published by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, together
with isolated issues of the Annual Digest or the InternationalLaw
Reports. The need for a more readily available guide to the actual
practice in this field of the law of armed conflict has become of major
significance with the establishment of the tribunal to try offenses committed in the former Yugoslavia, especially as it is so difficult to produce a comprehensive statement as to what amounts to a war crime or
even a crime against humanity. In fact, "[iun view of the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, it is probably preferable not to attempt to list war
crimes as each conflict will produce new types of offenses, new types of
violations of the law of war, which should be punished" (at 2 n. 8).
One must also bear in mind the differences between an "accused" and
a "war criminal," with the latter term reserved for one who has been
found guilty by a properly appointed tribunal (at iii), something that
the news media seem constantly to overlook.
To some extent this lacuna has been filled by Howard Levie with
the publication of his Terrorism in War: The Law of War Crimes. Here
will be found the most extensive summary of the jurisprudence produced in this field, together with a classification of the various trials
according to the nature of the offenses charged. In addition to fascinating chapters on the history of the treatment of war crimes from earliest times to date, classified under such headings as procedural matters; conventional war crimes; other offenses, including crimes against
peace and humanity, conspiracy, criminal organizations and command
responsibility; the accused, their victims, and their defenses. There are
further subclassificati ns enabling the reader, with the assistance of a
fairly comprehensive index and table of cases, to find his way about in
what might otherwise be a frightening morass of material. Because of
the historical approach adopted it is possible to give the lie to those
who maintain that trials of offenders against the laws and customs of
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war are a modem creation established to satisfy the demands for vengeance of the victors. In this connection it may be interesting to refer
to the 1966 trial in the German Democratic Republic of Heissmeyer for
conducting medical experiments on Jewish children and then arranging with the local SS commander, Strippel, to have them hanged "to
prevent their prior treatment from being discovered." Heissmeyer was
sentenced to life imprisonment, while Strippel, who had relocated to
the Federal Republic, was not tried for this offense, although he was
convicted for aiding in the murder of forty one Russian prisoners of
war and sentenced to a mere three and one-half years, which he never
served (at 441-42).
In the preface, the author states that
[alpart from battlefield war crimes, and to a certain extent even
there (denial of quarter and shooting of recently captured prisoners
of war and wounded soldiers), many categories of war crimes committed by the Nazis during World War II were intended to establish a reign of terror among various elements of the enemy. The
inmates of the concentration camps were terrorized... ; the civil-

ian inhabitants of occupied territories were terrorized... ; members of resistance movements were terrorized ... ; attempts were

made to terrorize merchant seamen by a program of slaughtering
the members of shipwrecked crews in order to encourage experienced personnel from making the Atlantic crossing; etc.; etc. (at iii).

What Levie says is perfectly true, but it is probably equally true
to state that every member of the armed forces experienced some sense
of terror when in action and under fire, and many a bombardment has
been directed with the intention of terrorizing the enemy. For this
reason, this reviewer considers it a little unfortunate that this major
work on war crimes has been issued as a volume in the series entitled
Terrorism:Documents of Internationaland Local Control (3rd Vol., 2nd
Series). This is particularly so in view of the fact that, apart from relatively brief extracts from some twenty five instruments, there are no
documents in the volume. Moreover, it is a little difficult to find these

extracts since there is no table of appendices. Further, in view of the
current usage of the term "terrorism" both in national and international law, the issue of war crimes is sufficiently significant to stand on its
own, with Levie's book as one of the most important in the literature
on this subject.
In a work of this character it is only possible to draw attention to
some of the inclusions, exclusions, and comments. It is always interesting to find references to the trial and execution of Captain Fryatt by
the Germans in 1916 (at 20-21), considered by the British as judicial
murder. But there is no discussion of the trial of Edith Cavell, whose

execution caused even more emotional reaction in both Britain and the
United States, even though it could well be argued that there was
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some justification for trying her since it is beyond the limits of a nursing sister's claim to immunity to assist escaping personnel to rejoin
their lines.1 Commenting on the paucity of war crimes decisions relating to naval warfare, Levie criticizes the Nuremberg findings against
Doenitz (at 63-8) and tends to agree that the sentences imposed by
United States tribunals were "too lenient" (at 98). Perhaps the most
well-known maritime decision after World War II was that arising
from the Peleus sinking. Here, Levie fails to mention that one of the
accused was a medical officer. Contrary to the statement at p. 106,
one of the officers, in fact the one who willingly took part in the shooting of the shipwrecked crew, was not executed but received a life sentence, only to be reprieved later as a result of debates instituted by
senior naval officers in the British House of Lords. While Levie is
critical of the dissents by Pal and Roling at Tokyo (at 149, etc.), he
overlooks the fact that Webb, the presiding judge, ordered one of the
defense counsel from the court for refusing to confine his examination
in chief solely to issues referred to by the prosecution.2 Regrettably,
when discussing the Gozawa case (at 174) he does not comment upon
the heiho defense and the contention therein that a prisoner of war
can have his status changed either by his own decision or that of his
captor while the conflict continues.
It has been suggested that the use of the term "grave breaches" in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 has meant that
other breaches of the law might not amount to punishable war crimes.
It is pleasant to find Levie agreeing with those who have no doubt that
"grave breaches" are still "war crimes" governed by the same system of
law (at 190). In this connection it is interesting to note that he is critical of the lack of adequate United States legislation to try American
personnel for "grave breaches" (at 237-38), although they would, as
was Calley, be liable to trial under United States military and criminal
law. He does not think that the "United States Senate would give its
advice and consent" to ratification of a convention establishing an
international criminal court (at 225 n. 16), although he does not state
why he has this feeling. He also suggests that, in view of the requirement in the 1949 Prisoners of War Convention that prisoners of war
must be tried in the same manner as one's own forces, it might not be
possible to establish such an international tribunal to try non-nationals in one's control unless the Geneva Convention is amended (at 25759; see also 511). However, in the course of a two-page Epilogue he
mentions the Security Council decision, reached with the active support of the United States, to establish an ad hoc international tribunal
"for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of

1. See, e.g., GARNER, INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND THE WORLD WAR, Vol. II at 97-

105 (1920).
2. THE TIMES (London), March 6, 1947; for similar 'strange' decisions by the
tribunal, see id., June 21, 1947 and September 26, 1947.
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international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991" (at 528). This may well indicate that the
United States may now be willing to accept an international criminal
court, in line with his overall conclusion:
There were undoubtedly defects in many of the post-World War II
war crimes programs. However, on the whole these programs were
successful in their objectives of weeding out the guilty from the
innocent, in providing appropriate punishment for the guilty, and
in establishing precedents which, hopefully, will have their impact
on future international relations by making the leaders of nations
more reluctant to embark upon adventurous wars of aggression and
by making individuals more reluctant to commit violations of the
law of war should they become involved in armed conflict. If this
hope is fulfilled, then the war crimes conducted [sic] after World
War II will have served the dual purpose of punishing the guilty
and of giving effective warning to members of subsequent generations that "war crimes do not pay"! (at 526).
On the other hand, we cannot overlook the fact that events in the
Gulf after the invasion of Kuwait as well as during the conflict in
Bosnia suggest that we still live in a world in which political leaders
will resort to aggression, and their troops, either spontaneously or by
command, will continue to commit atrocities comparable with many of
those perpetrated in the past. However, we must still be cautious before accepting the horror stories produced by propagandists or careless
organs of the media. Thus, in the Report on Iraqi War Crimes prepared
by the United States Secretary of the Army, it is stated that "[tihe
[civilian] deaths included 120 babies left to die after being removed
from incubators that were taken to Iraq" (at 527), although it has long
been accepted that this "atrocity" never occurred.
Should there be any war crimes trials held in response to the
conflict in Bosnia we may be sure that superior orders will be pleaded
by way of defence. Should this be so, Levie's warning that we must
distinguish between "duress" and "superior orders" (at 478) becomes
important. It is equally necessary to remember that, with the possible
exception of General Blaustein, who was relieved of his command, and
General Thoen, who was dismissed from the service, there is no evidence that anyone in Nazi Germany suffered for refusing to obey an
atrocity order (at 485). However, Levie implies that with the adoption
of Article 102 of the 1949 Prisoners of War Convention he is no longer
convinced that this may not constitute a defense (at 520). But we must
also not overlook the fact that most national systems of law only require compliance with a lawful order, that is to say one that is not
manifestly unlawful in the eyes of a reasonable soldier. Even more
significant is the requirement in Protocol I of 1977 that the legal advisers be attached to the armed forces. This should mean that superiors warned by their advisers that their orders may be illegal will carry
a clear responsibility for such orders, while if the adviser indicates
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that the order was lawful the ordinary soldier whose knowledge of the
law will be minimal should have every right to plead superior orders
in his defense and perhaps not only by way of mitigation of punishment.
Perhaps, in conclusion, attention may be drawn to a couple of errors that have been overlooked in proofreading. At p. 204 and again in
the Index at p. 714 Earl Russell's name appears as "Bertram" instead
of "Bertrand"; and we read:
It is interesting to note that an Englishman who had taught in a
German law school has expressed the opinion that during the interwar period the majority of German law students had been brought
up to believe that during World War I the Allies had completely
ignored the law of war (at 18 n. 76).
The author in question is Ernst J. Cohn who was a refugee German
law teacher living in England. More important is another footnote that
refers to the invasion by the Pakistan Army of East Pakistan, the war
with India, and the creation of Bangladesh:
For the alleged maltreatment of Bengali civilians (Hindus) by the
Pakistani Army (Moslems) in what was then East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh), from the Indian point of view (genocide), see Mehrish,
passim; for the alleged maltreatment of non-Bengali civilians (Moslems) by the Bengali Awami League (Hindu) in what was then East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), from the Pakistani point of view (genocide), see Aziz, passim. (at 208 n. 89).
In fact, the majority of the East Bengali civilians were Moslems, which
is why that part of Bengal was given to Pakistan, while the Awami
League is a Moslem organization.
Regardless of whether one agrees with every comment made by
Professor Levie in this study of Terrorism in War: The Law of War
Crimes, one cannot help but admire the learning and energy that have
gone into preparing this work, which will undoubtedly stand for many
years as one of the most important contributions to the study of this
subject that has been produced since the issue became one of debate
and consideration at the end of World War I.

